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SEDITION AMONG THE LOYALISTS: 
THE CASE OF SAINT JOHN, 1784-1786
D.G. Bell*
It is commonplace to say that Canada was conceived in negation: in a rejection of 
the secular republicanism introduced to a wondering world by the revolution in 
America, then carried to its atheistic apogee a decade later in France. While, 
indeed, it would scarcely be possible to overestimate the influence of the 
revolution in France in crystallizing British America’s anti-democratic ethos in the 
1790s, it was the earlier, American conflict which gave rise to what late-Victorian 
historians would fashion into English Canada’s founding myth. That myth was 
built around the northward flight, in 1783, of upwards of 30,000 American 
“Loyalists” into what remained of Britain’s mainland colonies. Defeated and exiled 
in the 18th century, it was said, the Loyalists and their rejection of republicanism 
and democracy were vindicated in the 19th century as the United States proved 
vicious and unstable, while the virtuous British colonies to the north resolved the 
Blackstonean sovereignty paradox that had wrecked the first British Empire and 
became the brightest jewels of Empire-Commonwealth.1 As with most 
mythologies, that which depicts Loyalists as the anti-republican, anti-democratic 
founders of English Canada has a measure of truth. Their advent more than 
doubled the non-French-speaking population of British America, triggered division 
of two old colonies, created three new ones with their attendant officiai 
hierarchies, and provided critical local content for a strain of anti-Americanism 
that would be invoked often in the 19th century.
When moving from mythology to fact it is always well to be cautious in 
generalizing about the Loyalists. Their outlook varied greatly according to 
background in the old colonies, wartime experience and place of resettlement. 
Upper Canada’s primitive new townships were a world away from the polished and 
highly differentiated societies at Shelburne and Saint John. Conversely, the War 
of 1812 added to Upper Canada’s “Loyalist” history whole chapters of infinite 
service to mythmakers in a way which had no parallel, and for which the 
ideological need was less pressing, in the Maritimes.2 Yet despite these and other 
differences, a survey of the principal Loyalist communities at the very beginning 
of the exile experience discloses similarities which, together, were described aptly
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by one startled observer as “amazing discontents”.3 In the mid-1780s such 
distempers beset Loyalists in Sorel, Kingston, Cornwall, Prince Edward Island, 
Shelburne, Annapolis-Digby, and at Saint John harbour.4 In every case they arose 
chiefly from a conjunction of two factors: delay in getting onto surveyed farms, 
coupled with the suspicion that Loyalist leaders were engrossing a disproportionate 
share of land at the expense of the rank-and-file, with a view to entrenching 
themselves as a local elite. In two notable cases — Shelburne and Saint John — this 
discontent and suspicion led to major riots, and Digby and Cornwall were only a 
hair-breadth from organized violence. Each of the major and some of the minor 
civilian Loyalist communities were, then, characterized at their inception by a 
contest to establish a local hierarchy. In the course of this intestine struggle, 
embattled elites did not hesitate to delegitimize their critics by labelling them as 
seditious. In this ineffably ironic, almost Kafkaesque epilogue to the Revolution, 
exiled Loyalists came to be branded by other Loyalists as disloyal.
The particular story of nine sedition prosecutions and related acts of official 
repression at early Saint John would repay attention even if those troubles lacked 
such arresting parallels in other Loyalist communities of resettlement. Here the 
contest for power lasted longest and assumed the most extreme rhetorical and 
legal dimensions. While not the largest of the Loyalist settlements, Saint John was 
the most important in that it became the political focus for a whole colony in a 
sense that Shelburne or Cornwall or Kingston did not. Research on Saint John’s 
founding is enriched incomparably by the presence of rival newspapers and the 
survival of important collections of private correspondence. Moreover, the 
ultimate phase of Saint John’s troubles was preceded by the 1785 provincial 
general election campaign which, conducted on a nearly universal manhood 
suffrage, served both to heighten the rhetoric of debate and to provide some idea 
of the relative strength of the competing factions. As part of its struggle to 
intimidate electoral opponents, New Brunswick’s governing elite initiated a multi­
faceted campaign of repression punctuated by trials for seditious libel.
* * * * *
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Over several months beginning in May 1783 the harbour at the mouth of the St 
John River was the debarkation point for over 10,000 Loyalist evacuees from 
British-occupied New York city. By origin, most were from the Middle colonies 
and Connecticut, though a significant minority was British. About half of the 
arrivals were civilian “Refugees”; the others were disbanding “Provincial” soldiers 
of the various Loyalist regiments, with their families, and some disbanded British 
regulars. They landed in an almost entirely unsettled (though not ungranted) area 
of Nova Scotia. Because little preparation had been made for their advent, most 
were forced to spend the winter of 1783-4 at Saint John rather than moving 
upriver to their promised farmland. It was from this winter of delay and despair 
that, in a sense, all later troubles sprang. Discontent was manifested not so much 
against Governor John Parr and his administration at Halifax as it was against the 
Loyalist leaders he chose to deal with at Saint John. For the most part these were 
either the leading men designated by British military at New York to have charge 
of the various civilian migration groups or ex-officers of the disbanded regiments. 
The Nova Scotia government simply commissioned several of this number as 
justices of the peace and let it be known that it would deal with the settlement 
through their agency. Against these “agents and directors” it was popularly 
alleged that in distributing town lots at the river’s mouth they had awarded 
themselves and their friends a disproportionate number of the situations useful for 
commerce. True to their American political heritage, those who opposed the 
town’s unelected leaders convened publicly to select representatives, establish 
“committees of correspondence” and issue “remonstrances”. The town’s first 
newspaper, the St John Gazette, begun in December 1783, made itself the organ 
of this disaffected group. Thereby, only a few months into exile, some Saint 
Johners showed the world that, while they might not be republicans, they were not 
political naifs.5
The principal source of information on the opposition faction is the St John 
Gazette between 1783 and 1786. Virtually every surviving issue contains 
anonymous letters, poetry and more versatile literary creations denouncing with 
striking vehemence the settlement’s unelected leadership. Even in the agitated 
context the time, one such production, published on 4 March 1784, was 
sensational. Addressing his remarks to the many disbanded Provincials in the 
settlement, “A Soldier” concluded his letter with a veiled but unmistakable allusion 
to the possibility of collective violence:
I would not wish you to think I mean to cause discontent or excite discord among
you. I mean to warn you of your impending inevitable ruin should government
withdraw her bounty, leaving you inhabitants of the barren rocks or tenants to a
fortunate few that either by bribery or fraud possess all the habitable lands
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expressly contrary to the King’s order. No feeling men whose hearts are warm 
with loyalty could wish to rob you of your just rights, and those miserly wretches 
(void of principle and compassion) must feel the force of a justly enraged soldiery 
... should they succeed in their mercenary attempts.
In a community which had experienced one minor outbreak of mob violence 
already and was declared with some frequency to be “in a state of Anarchy” in 
which the “common people” were becoming “insolent & rude” and betraying 
“stron[g] Symptoms of Discontent,”6 Saint John’s weary magistrates were quick 
to seize on these references to “discontent”, “discord” and “a justly enraged 
soldiery” as the pretext for administering an exemplary check to their critics. 
Within a day of the paper’s publication the magistrates had used their power to 
trace the author of the piece and the chain of communication that had brought it 
to the newspaper. They selected for prosecution the two printers themselves and 
the man who had left the letter at their publishing shop, who not by coincidence 
was the brother-in-law of Elias Hardy, the foremost figure in the town’s dissident 
faction. The actual author of the piece, though exposed, was not charged; it was 
the leaders of the opposition faction who were to be targeted, not their pawns. 
So it was that William Lewis and John Ryan (the printers) and William Huggeford 
were arrested, brought before a grand jury and indicted by it on 10 March 1784 
for publishing “among the subjects of our said lord the King a certain seditious 
and scandalous libel.”7
The outcome of these prosecutions is unknown. Trial before the county 
sessions of the peace would have put in play the awkward possibility that a jury of 
twelve would acquit the proprietors of what was still the town’s only press. It may 
be, then, that the absence of records on the fate of the prosecutions means simply 
that the accused were put on recognizance and trials never proceeded with. 
Thereby the managers of the town — the very men who in their capacity as JPs 
would have presided over any trial at sessions — could suppose that they had put 
their critics on the defensive without risking the possibility of a humiliating reversal 
from the jury.
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Three months later, in the summer of 1784, for reasons which had little to do 
with unrest at the mouth of the St John River, the British government divided all 
Nova Scotia into three parts. Thereby the St John valley became the backbone of 
a new province called New Brunswick. Colonel Thomas Carleton, brother of the 
last British commander-in-chief at New York, arrived in Saint John on 21 
November 1784 as governor. Carleton himself was an Englishman whose colonial 
experience was purely military, but the central officers of administration who 
followed him to New Brunswick were all Loyalists and practically unconnected 
with the detested agents and directors who had managed Saint John to this point. 
Carleton soon fixed the new colony’s intended capital in the remote hamlet of 
Fredericton, but Saint John remained the seat of government and judiciary until 
late in 1786, by which time the tumults noted below must have made the decision 
to relocate the capital seem wise indeed.
Almost everyone assumed that once Loyalists themselves were in charge of an 
almost purely Loyalist colony, all of the earlier troubles would vanish. The newly- 
arrived governing elite approached its task with such self-flattering heroism that 
Solicitor General Ward Chipman likened the planting of Saint John to the 
founding of Carthage and Rome, Admiralty judge Jonathan Sewall called it the 
Loyalists’ “New Jerusalem”; Surrogate General Edward Winslow vowed that it 
would be the most “Gentlemanlike” government “on earth”, and, on half a dozen 
occasions, various writers declared that New Brunswick would soon be the 
flourishing “envy” of the American states.8 Moreover, thousands of Loyalists 
formerly stranded unhappily at Saint John were now scattered inland on their 
promised farm lots, and a second Saint John newspaper had been established, this 
one supportive of Carleton’s regime. Under such favourable auspices the governor 
moved with confidence in the fall of 1785 to call New Brunswick’s first general 
election. As formal land grants had for the most part not yet been issued, it was 
impossible to decree a voting qualification based on property holding. 
Accordingly, with a daring they would soon regret, governor and council awarded 
the franchise to all adult white males of three months’ residence.
In the key Saint John constituency, which was to choose six of twenty-six 
members in the House of Assembly, the government ticket was headed by 
Attorney General Jonathan Bliss and Solicitor General Chipman. To the “utter 
astonishment of every body” in the governing circle, the election in the town where 
all of them still resided turned into an intense and sophisticated anti-government 
campaign. Banners, badges, placards and handbills were as much in evidence as 
if the election had been in pre-Revolutionary New York, although the parallel 
invoked by some Saint Johners themselves was that of John Wilkes and “shameful
®For extensive citations, see D.G. Bell, “Paths to the Law in the Maritimes, 1810-1825: The Bliss 
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and corrupt practices à la mode de WestminsterZ’9 The early days of the election 
were punctuated by a major riot of opposition supporters at Mallard’s coffee­
house, the headquarters for the government candidates. The disturbance was 
suppressed only through intervention and arrests by British troops, a constitutional 
blunder reflecting the depth of Carleton’s surprise and panic, and an act which 
itself became a popular grievance.10
Here, in the midst as it were of the protracted 1785 election campaign at Saint 
John, it is useful to examine the rhetoric employed by the two sides. Almost 
everything known of it comes from the two weekly newspapers, which overflowed 
with earnest, bitter, witty and learned productions from writers styling themselves 
“Horatio”, “Claudius”, “Britannius”, “A Loyalist”, “Mrs Mira”, “Aesop”, “A 
Native American Loyalist”, “A Plain Dealer”, “Urbanitatis”, and the like. 
Although elaborate literary rituals may seem extraordinary in a community of now 
only four or five thousand, on the edge of the wilderness, in which true anonymity 
must have been impossible, they are a further sign of how much the politics of 
Saint John owed to the rhetorical techniques Americans had honed in the decade 
of debate preceding the outbreak of rebellion.
Even some of the issues dividing Saint Johners were connected directly to 
political tensions in the Old colonies, particularly New York. The two opposition 
leaders at Saint John, for example — Elias Hardy and Tertullus Dickinson — had 
led a major indignation protest by rank-and-file Loyalists in British-occupied New 
York city.11 Similarly, the proprietors of the St John Gazette and the Royal 
Gazette had been rival printers there.12 When Saint Johners were exhorted not 
to vote for Jonathan Bliss and Ward Chipman because they were lawyers and 
government placemen, they were reminded of an issue that had become a staple 
of 18th-century colonial politics, and varying precedents from pre-Revolutionary
9Letter, J. Sewell to J. Sewall [sic], 5 December 1785: NAC, Sewell Papers, MG 23, GII, 10.
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New York, Pennsylvania and Nova Scotia were duly canvassed.13 When 
opposition agitators urged voters not to support Bliss and Chipman because they 
were from Massachusetts, and exiles from that colony were already too powerful 
in New Brunswick, where the great majority of people came from New York, 
Connecticut and New Jersey, they invoked a long-standing colonial prejudice 
against natives of the Bay colony.14 By persisting in raising delayed and unequal 
distribution of land, opposition campaigners played to an issue which resonated 
deeply with many American colonists -  former New Yorkers in particular — who 
were acutely aware of the vast, neo-feudal manors in the Hudson valley, with their 
thousands of tenants. When, therefore, opposition polemicists alleged that 
deliberate delays in the settlement process were part of a plan to reduce the rank 
and file to the status of “slaves” (ie, tenants), they invoked “a central concept in 
eighteenth-century political discourse” and played on one of pre-Revolutionary 
New York’s most sensitive public issues.15
In the rhetoric of government supporters, two interrelated themes emerge 
portending the regime’s subsequent legal offensive against its detractors. One is 
what may be called the “patriotic” issue. In their election handbill the government 
candidates style themselves as the “disinterested patriotic candidates”, implying 
thereby that their opposers were seeking to gain public office for private 
advantage. Other publications characterize Attorney General Bliss and his fellow 
candidates as “divested of any interested motive”, “without any selfish views, or 
considerations of private interest”, and the like.16 Conversely, opposition 
candidates are maligned repeatedly with the favourite 18th-century epithet of 
“factious” and its synonyms. They were “plotters”, a “party”, a “cabal”, 
“interested”, “artful”, “scheming”, “designing”, and “ambitious”; their success
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Bonomi,y4 Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York (New York; Columbia University 
Press, 1971) at 241-5; for Nova Scotia, see J.W. Lawrence, Judges of New Brunswick and Their Tünes 
(Saint John: Acadiensis, 1907) at 177.
14Letter, J. Parr to Lord Sydney, 26 July 1784: PRO, CO 217, vol. 50; St John Gazette, 13 May 1784; 
Royal Gazette, Saint John, 8 November 1785, 6 December 1785; M.B. Norton, The British Americans: 
The Loyalist Exiles in England, 1774-1789 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972) at 67-8.
Petition of the Electors of Saint John, 3 March 1786: PANB, RS 42, R. v. Charles et al (1786); 
“Americanus” seditious libel: PANB, RS 42, R. v. Lewis & Ryan (1786); St John Gazette, 29 January 
1784,13 May 1784; “Gentleman of Halifax”, Vindication of Governor Parr and His Council, against 
the Complaints of Certain Persons... (London: John Stockdale, 1784) at 24,31 [CIHM #37513]; Bailyn, 
supra note 10 at 232; R. Berthoff & J.M. Murrin, “Feudalism, Communalism, and the Yeoman 
Freeholder. The American Revolution Considered as a Social Accident” in S.G. Kurtz & J.H. Hutson, 
eds., Essays on the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973) at 256; 
R.C. Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781 (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1973) c. 37.
16The only extant copy of the handbill is in W.O. Raymond scrapbook, vol. 5, at the Saint John 
Regional Library; Royal Gazette, Saint John, 1 November 1785.
came from deluding the ignorant and unthinking. Such rhetoric led almost 
irresistibly to the insinuation that those who opposed Carleton’s regime were 
seditious and disloyal.17 One might have thought such epithets taboo in a 
community composed almost exclusively of Loyalists, but the course of the 1785 
election campaign at Saint John so alarmed the governing circle that even this 
constraint was shattered. Thus one anonymous writer complained that the 
opposition’s rhetoric made him “shudder” as reminiscent of the propaganda 
responsible for the “late American usurpation”. Another warned that defeat for 
the attorney general’s slate in the Saint John election would prove to the world 
“that the seeds of sedition and rebellion are already sown”. A third charged that 
Elias Hardy and other opposition leaders were of a “Republican craft”. Their 
principles, it was said, “correspond exactly with those of the rebels, by similar 
motives or some caprice, flung among the Loyalists; and they brought with them 
all that restless turbulence and levelling disposition, that characterized the enemies 
of loyalty.”18
Such language was already in the air when Governor Carleton’s supposition 
that the first New Brunswick election would be a quiet affair began manifestly to 
go wrong. Because voting at Saint John was conducted over a number of days it 
was soon evident that the opposition’s slate was well ahead. Then occurred, as 
noted above, the Mallard House riot, its suppression by military intervention and 
the arrest of several second-rank opposition figures for their part in the disorder. 
Carleton’s circle had misjudged the temper of the town entirely, and government 
forces both at the polls and in the streets were desperately on the defensive. What 
was to be done?
The first thought was to overwhelm the opposition by resorting to the 
constitutionally dubious expedient of voting the 160 officers and men of the 54th 
regiment, who had lately been so useful as police. The sheriff himself was 
prepared to allow this, and his deputy actually admitted the vote of one 
sergeant.19 When the six opposition candidates learned this they sent protests to 
both sheriff and governor-in-coundl which raised the delicate question of just what 
election — and other — laws governed a new colony in which the legislature had yet 
to sit. Nova Scotia had never succeeded in enacting an election statute, so there 
was no question of accepting passively the voting laws of that notoriously
17On the link in Loyalist thought between ideas of faction and disloyalty see J. Potter [MacKinnon],
The Liberty We Seek: Loyalist Ideology in Colonial New York and Massachusetts (Cambridge MA: 
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republican colony.20 The alternative was for the Council to fix by ordinance the 
principles on which the election would be conducted, and this it had done, but only 
in the briefest terms. None of the English statutes specifying who could vote or 
become a candidate or regulating the conduct of the sheriff was invoked. In the 
wake of the riot, when it became urgent to think of voting the garrison in order 
to save the election for the government, these lacunae in the voting ordinance 
suddenly became the focus for agitated consideration.
In effect, government forces determined to have it both ways. On one hand, 
the two law officers (themselves election candidates) advised the sheriff that the 
English electoral regime -  with its careful curbs on participation by those holding 
office under the Crown -  did not extend to the province: “You will remember 
Sir,” opposition candidates later reminded the sheriff, “that the Statute Law of 
England relative to Elections was repeatedly urged by us and as often rejected as 
not Extending hither and with it of course the Bill of Rights, which is an English 
Statute and the Basis of Parliamentary Freedom.”21 On the other hand, when the 
sheriff thought it in the government’s interest to grant a scrutiny of the votes cast, 
the lack of any legal warrant for such a proceeding proved no impediment to his 
professing to take as precedent “the Late Election at Westminster”, although in 
fact he followed it only to the extent convenient. In the end, however, the garrison 
was not voted. It is tempting to think that this was — as the English radical 
William Cobbett, one of the soldiers stationed at Saint John, later claimed — 
because the privates of the 54th regiment were actually in sympathy with the 
opposition.22 Quite apart from this possibility, one suspects that Carleton was 
deterred from allowing military votes because such a manoeuvre would have 
become a constitutional grievance of such magnitude that even far-off London 
could not have overlooked it. If the Saint John election were to be salvaged for 
Carleton’s regime it would be in some other way.
The means fixed on — a scrutiny of voter eligibility conducted by the bitterly 
partisan sheriff — rejected nearly 200 opposition votes on grounds of non-
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residence, producing thereby a narrow win of the six seats for the government.23 
Opposition candidates protested the sheriffs conduct to the House of Assembly 
when it convened, early in 1786, but its pro-government majority vindicated him. 
By this time, however — in the wake of the Mallard House election riot and its 
attendant arrests, the intervention of troops, and the stolen election — the 
opposition’s front-rank leaders had lost control over their disillusioned Saint John 
supporters, who now became so extravagant in their conduct as to give the 
government pretext for a stern and concerted campaign of suppression.
That campaign had a number of aspects, all exemplary, and all involving the 
notion of sedition. In one minor though vivid episode, a second-rank opposition 
figure who had protested the Assembly’s vindication of the sheriff by remarking 
in a coffee-house that “the House of Assembly ought to be tore limb from limb” 
or that “he wondered the People did not tare them limb from limb” was 
denounced to the Assembly and ordered arrested for “publickly speaking and 
uttering certain opprobrious Words in Contempt and Breach of the priviledges of 
this House and tending to excite Sedition”. Brought to the bar of the House on 
26 January 1786, the offending speaker was ordered committed until he should 
“ask pardon of this House, on his knees.”24
Within a month of the “kneeling man” ritual the authorities were able to turn 
their attention to the opposition press when Lewis and Ryan unguardedly 
published a long and vehement anti-government letter from a writer styled 
“Americanus”. The bulk of the composition is a lurid rehearsal of the emotive 
theory that the Loyalist leadership had delayed distribution of farmland 
deliberately, so as to reduce the mass of exiles to such desperation that they would 
be willing to become tenants (“slaves”) to the great. As with the “Soldier” letter 
of two years earlier, it was the writer’s desperate exhortation to action which 
sealed the printers’ fate:
[W]e are distressed in looking forward. We scarcely dare view tomorrow. Our 
Provisions almost gone. Our lands not brought into cultivation. Our Loyalty 
suspected.... [TJear the mask from their Faces, and exhibit their naked Enormities 
to the whole World. [L]et us not disgrace Loyalty with Cowardice. My distressed 
Countrymen, let us oppose every the least Violation of our Privileges. ... Submit 
not to petit Tyrants. ... In Fine, let the world know ... the Rights you are jealous 
of, manifesting yourselves to be the Descendants of Britons.25
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version of the piece to survive is that copied into the Supreme Court record, which is here excerpted 
without the attorney general’s interpolated averments. Authorship of the piece was never uncovered.
Publication of these inflammatory urgings — reflecting the agitated disillusion 
caused by the Assembly’s complicity in the theft of the Saint John election — led 
predictably to the arrest of Lewis and Ryan for “printing and publishing a 
scandalous and seditious libel”. Just two weeks later, and even before they came 
to trial, the printers announced the dissolution of their partnership, and the St 
John Gazette ceased publication. “The Printers have laid aside their paper”, the 
governor chortled, “and the Citizens disown these incendiaries”.26 Thereby 
Carleton’s regime succeeded in silencing the principal vehicle of opposition 
expression.
At the very time Attorney General Bliss was bringing his case against the 
opposition press, the Assembly was moving to intimidate and silence the entire 
New Brunswick population. The means chosen was one of the most overtly 
repressive statutes in the whole Canadian experience between the American 
rebellion and the War Measures Act: a law against political petitioning. 
Petitioning was a ritual of political expression which carried considerable freight 
in F.nglish constitutional history. The same had been true in the Old colonies, 
where petitioning gave a voice to those who were excluded otherwise from the 
political process.27 When, therefore, the newly-convened General Assembly -  
alarmed that petitions against its vindication of the sheriff s conduct in the Saint 
John election were attracting hundreds of signatures -  resurrected from the reign 
of Charles II a statute against petitioning, it sent a uniquely repressive signal to its 
detractors, while setting at defiance the Glorious Revolution’s Bill of Rights. The 
professed purpose of New Brunswick’s Act against Tumults and Disorders, upon 
pretence of preparing or presenting Public Petitions, or other Addresses, to the 
Governor, or General Assembly was to “prevent tumultuous and other disorderly 
soliciting... of Hands, by private persons, to Petitions, Complaints, Remonstrances, 
and Declarations ... to the Governor ... for alteration of matters established by 
Law, [or] redress of pretended grievances in Church or State ... being made use 
of to serve the ends of factious and seditious persons, to the violation of the Public 
peace.” The effect of the legislation was to outlaw petitions “for alteration of 
matters established by Law in Church or State” with more than twenty signatures 
unless they had the prior consent of three justices of the peace or a grand jury. 
Violators would receive three months’ imprisonment and a £100 fine.28
Introduced into the Council, the Tumults bill was concurred in by the House 
of Assembly on 1 March 1786 and given Carleton’s assent the day following. It
^Letter, T. Carleton to Lord Sydney, 14 May 1786: PRO, CO 188, vol. 3.
^J.P. Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1986) at 21-3.
^ N B  1786, c. 58; it disappeared only with New Brunswick’s general statute revision in 1854. Its 
Restoration original was 13 Car. II c. 5, which was not repealed until 1986.
was a direct response to the petition campaign which had been underway for a 
month and which was attracting support in rural counties as well as Saint John. 
Only one of these petitions survives, but it alone contains upwards of 300 
signatures, all from Saint John. Just days after the Tumults bill became law, four 
of the petition’s leading sponsors called on the provincial secretary to present it. 
Jonathan Odell declined that honour but said that they might call the next day to 
offer it to the governor personally, at the same time warning them formally that 
the law against petitioning had come into effect. Accordingly, when the presenters 
waited on Carleton on 7 March to hand in the document, both sides were engaged 
in a self-conscious ritual of confrontation. The four -  Claudius Charles, W illiam  
Thompson, Joseph Montgomery, and John Carnes -  were arrested quickly, 
examined before Saint John’s mayor, and charged with publishing a seditious 
libel.29
Among many remarkable political compositions surviving from the tumultuous 
early history of Saint John, the petition of March 1786 is uniquely compelling. 
None of the leading opposition figures signed it, and it conspicuously lacks their 
rhetorical polish. It is, however, this very quality of artlessness which makes it 
such an arrestingly eloquent expression of grievance, despair and desperation. 
Something of its special character is captured in its sonorous opening sentence:
We His Majestys dutiful and Affectionate Subjects, Electors of the City & County 
of St. John, after having suffered every Evil which could be inflicted upon loyal 
Subjects by the cruel Hand of Usurpation, for an Adherence to the Person of Our 
King and His Government, and a most oppressive Tyranny since our Arrival in this 
Place, patiently have borne those Hardships from a due Regard to the British 
Constitution, under the firm Persuasion of being relieved from our Bondage upon 
Your Excellency’s arrival, cannot now sit silent under the complicated Grievances 
we suffer and the fearful Apprehensions of what this infant Settlement must 
undergo, if such dangerous measures are persisted in, which threaten no less than 
a speedy Dissolution of the same or a Revolution, to us no less dreadful: 
particularly the most daring, violent and alarming Invasion of our Liberties striking 
directly at the Vitals of our most excellent Constitution.30
These sensational allegations — with references to “a most oppressive 
Tyranny”, “Bondage”, “complicated Grievances”, and suggesting the possibility of 
mass return to the United States or a “Revolution” — were alone enough to invite 
prosecution. But there was more. After a lengthy catalogue of election-related 
grievances and a request that Carleton call a new vote, the petitioners concluded
29Since the Tumults law had been passed for the very purpose of suppressing this petition and since 
the presenters had been explicitly warned under the legislation, it is surprising that the four were 
charged not with its violation but with seditious libel. The only obvious reason to prefer seditious 
libel was the advantage it gave the Crown in limiting the role of the trial jury, as noted below.
Pétition of the Electors of Saint John, 3 March 1786: PANB, RS 42, R  v. Charles et al (1786).
with a threat which no government could ignore. They asserted that laws made 
by an Assembly “so unconstitutionally composed” could have no binding force. 
It cannot be wondered, therefore, that the four presenters were arrested on a 
warrant alleging that they had published “a certain inflammatory, seditious and 
scandalous libel purporting to be a petition to the Governor ... tending to excite 
sedition and rebellion against our Government, which said libel also denieth the 
authority of the Laws ... and the legality of the Assembly now sitting”.31 Through 
such averments Carleton’s regime contrived to equate criticism of a colonial 
government with opposition to the King, and proceeded on that basis to prosecute 
Loyalists for disloyalty. Indeed, in the excited imagination of the regime’s attorney 
general, circulation of this “most seditious” document was “little short of an overt 
act of High Treason”.32
Printers William Lewis and John Ryan and the four petition presenters all 
came to trial at Supreme Court sittings in May 1786, the occasion on which the 
Mallard House rioters also took their trial. None of those charged with sedition 
was indicted through means of the county grand jury. An administration in which 
both law officers were from Massachusetts had ample reason to fear the 
reluctance of an American grand jury to indict for seditious libel.33 Instead 
Attorney General Bliss adopted the safer course usual in sedition prosecutions in 
England by proceeding ex officio to lodge informations with the Supreme Court. 
Once charges were procured in this manner, the actual trial presented relatively 
little political risk. At trial of a seditious libel the petit jury decided only the 
factual question of whether the prisoners had “published” the words in question 
and whether any innuendoes were as the Crown alleged. It was the judge — and 
in New Brunswick all judges were members of the privy and legislative Councils, 
and Chief Justice George Ludlow was styled the regime’s “prime Minister”34 -  
who decided whether the publication in question was seditious.35 Prosecuted and 
tried under such an arrangement, and in the context of the prevailing campaign of 
suppression, it is not surprising that the two printers and the four presenters were 
convicted and fined.
These six convictions for seditious libel, together with the trials of the election 
rioters, were the denouement of the official campaign against political dissent in 
early Saint John. The election of six opposition Assemblymen had been
31 Arrest warrant, 8 March 1786: NAC, Lawrence Collection, MG 23, Dl.
32Letter, J. Bliss to S.S. Blowers, 17 March 1786: PANS, Bliss Papers, vol. 1603.
^Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 24 at c. 3.
MSupra note 32.
^Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 24 at 11-12; TA. Green, Verdict According to Conscience: 
Perspectives on the English Criminal Jury, 1200-1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) c. 
8.
forestalled, the opposition press had been silenced, public petitioning had been 
suppressed. Even prior to the trials Attorney General Bliss thought that the 
opposition had “discovered some Symptoms of Fear & Dejection, & some of them 
of Penitence & Reformation”. Within a week of their dose, Governor Carleton 
reported complaisantly to London that his policy of ruling New Brunswick with a 
“strait hand” had met with “every success”. The province had been brought into 
“perfect order and obedience”. His factious opposition had, he noted discreetly, 
“failed” to win election to the Assembly. Following this failure they had 
“procured by every Artifice libellous petitions and published inflammatory pieces 
in a Newspaper”: “A prosecution has been carried on in the Supreme Court 
against the promoters of these disorders. The Rioters, Printers, and those who 
presented the Petition have been severally convicted and punished and ... faction 
is at an end here.”36
To the outward eye, Carleton was correct. In December 1786 the rector of Saint 
John preached a special sermon before Saint John’s most influential dissidents on 
the Pleasure and Advantage of Brotherly Unity.37 Although the sermon had 
reference ostensibly to the fluctuating fortunes of ancient Israel, no doubt he 
preached and was understood in a double sense. The “late calamities, owing to 
civil dissention” were Saint John’s; so also, apparently, was the “love and 
harmony” which now prevailed in the town. In the short term, at least, political 
dissention was at an end. Carleton could assure his superiors truthfully that the 
“most perfect tranquillity” now prevailed over every part of the province.38
And what of the future? While the political faction which emerged in early 
Saint John, first in opposition to the agents and directors and then to Carleton’s 
High Tory administration, was still discemably at work as late as 1793,39 there is 
no apparent link in personnel between the politics of the settlement process and
36Letter, T. Carleton to Lord Sydney, 14 May 1786: PRO, CO 188, vol. 3.
37G. Bisset, The Pleasure and Advantage of Brotherly Unity (Saint John, 1787) at 5. The address was 
a St John’s day sermon to the Masons of the 54th regiment, but Saint John’s civilian lodge -  which 
was dominated by first and second-rank opposition leaders -  would also have attended: see W.F. 
Bunting, History of St John's Lodge, F. & AM. of Saint John (Saint John: J. & A. McMillan, 1895) c. 
1 [CIHM #00329].
^Letter, T. Carleton to E. Nepean, 1 June 1786: PRO, CO 188, vol. 3. It is striking how little resort 
was had to seditious libel prosecutions after 1786. The nine cases noted here are probably more than 
half of all such trials in the entire history of the province. I have found other cases only in 1801 (2), 
1805,1821,1828 and 1830. The sedition panic of the 1790s in other jurisdictions seems not to have 
found judicial reflection in New Brunswick.
^Letter, W. Chipman to J. Odell, 23 February 1793, quoted in Lawrence, Judges of New Brunswick, 
supra note 14 at 186-7.
the opposition faction that was to dominate New Brunswick politics beginning in 
the mid 1790s under the brilliant Scotch émigré James Glenie. Many who had 
opposed Carleton’s regime through the tumultuous election of 1785 and its 
crushing aftermath had long since slipped back to the land of rebellion, such as the 
printer William Lewis; by 1792 Saint John’s population had fallen to a mere 2000. 
Others, like Elias Hardy, made their peace with the dominant order. In this way 
New Brunswick’s initially pronounced tendency towards what historians of the 
Revolution call “Whig loyalism”40 was attenuated greatly.
But though there may be no overt link between events in early Saint John and 
New Brunswick’s constitutional controversies of the 1790s associated with the clash 
between Carleton and Glenie, there is an evident structural parallel. In both cases 
what might have been a routine political squabble was transformed into a full- 
dress crisis of grand proportion because the colony’s governing clique chose to 
make it so. In each case Carleton’s administration might have chosen to respond 
to political challenge by political art but chose instead unflinching confrontation. 
In each case its ultimate weapon was delegitimization of its opposition through the 
charge of disloyalty. From this perspective the crises of the 1780s and the 1790s 
are effects of the same cause -  the attempt of New Brunswick’s governing elite to 
achieve psychological redemption through creation of a model Loyalist colony. 
Any deviation from that model was resisted to the uttermost.
Finally, it is instructive to reflect on the tactic used by Carleton’s regime as its 
political trump card in the 1780s (as again in the 1790s) — the “Loyalty Cry”. 
When it felt its “Gentlemanlike” vision of New Brunswick in political jeopardy 
through the rise of an opposition, the governing circle instinctively equated support 
for themselves with loyalty to king and constitution, and opposition to themselves 
with disloyalty and republicanism. In this sense, the sedition trials and related acts 
of official repression at Loyalist Saint John are the earliest notable setting for a 
tactic which would become a familiar one in 19th-century Canadian politics. It was 
a similar Loyalty Cry which was invoked during Lieutenant-Governor Craig’s 
“reign of terror” in Lower Canada in 1810-11 and which smashed the Upper 
Canadian reformers at the election of 1836, triggering the rebellion of 1837. It 
was the same tactic which induced New Brunswickers to reverse their opposition 
to intercolonial union in 1866, thereby making possible Confederation. It was a 
Loyalty Cry which frightened Canadians away from free trade with the United 
States at the federal election of 1911. In different settings, in different generations 
politicians would find the Loyalty Cry useful in dishing their opponents because, 
for most of their history, British North Americans could not take continued 
independence from the United States for granted. Consciously or subconsciously, 
“loyalty” was almost always in question.
^On Whig Loyalism sec, for example, Calhoon, Loyalists in Revolutionary America, supra note 15 at 
563.
Yet it will be noted that on this prototypical occasion, in early Saint John, the 
Loyalty Cry failed to work, at least in immediate terms. Despite the government’s 
attempt to stampede the electorate by branding political dissenters as rebels, it was 
the opposition which, prior to the scrutiny, won a large majority at the Saint John 
polls on an almost universal manhood suffrage. In resisting the cry, the Loyalists 
themselves evinced a confidence in their attachment to the British constitution 
which their children and grandchildren would evidently lack. Ironically, however, 
the refusal of most Saint Johners to heed a counterfeit Loyalty Cry only triggered 
more overtly coercive measures from government. Carleton’s regime 
demonstrated that it would go to almost any lengths to render 18th-century New 
Brunswickers passive and obedient; thereby the transformation from American 
Loyalist to New Bruns wicker was well begun.
